Abstract Since there is no authoritative, comprehensive and public historical record of nuclear power plant accidents, we reconstructed a nuclear accident data set from peer-reviewed and other literature. We found that, in a sample of five random years, the worldwide historical frequency of a nuclear major accident, defined as an INES level 7 event, is 14 %. The probability of at least one nuclear accident rated at level C4 on the INES scale is 67 %. These numbers are subject to uncertainties because of the fuzziness of the definition of a nuclear accident.
Introduction
The major accident that occurred in Fukushima on March 11, 2011, led to a renewed scientific interest in assessing nuclear risks. In the press, there have been a number of declarations such as Laponche and Dessus (2011) who claimed that the probability of a serious nuclear accident in the next 30 years was a ''statistical certainty'' for the European Union. Countries such as Austria, China, Finland, France, Germany, India and Italy have responded with the adoption of very diverse nuclear safety and energy policies. Considering the policy importance of this issue, we re-compute these estimates of the risk of a nuclear accident by constructing our own data set and using a different method.
Risk has two dimensions: the probability of an accident and the magnitude of its consequences. This paper deals with the first dimension of risk, the probability. The causes that might result in a serious nuclear accident are manifold and they include but are not limited to: design errors, construction problems, material or hardware deficiencies, internal events such as pipe break or fire, external events such as a plane crash or natural hazards (earthquake, floods), and mostly human causes, such as errors in manipulation, insufficient safety information and lack of knowledge of instructions. In many cases, the accidents are due to a combination of several factors.
Despite the complexity of causes, nuclear engineers and scientists have tried to estimate the probability of a nuclear accident. One commonly used method is the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) method which computes, in a bottom-up combination, the probability of an accident as the product of the probabilities of all known different possible failures. This method allows one to assess risks and identify potential improvements to safety. PRA analyses are, however, bound to be subject to uncertainties since they cannot be totally exhaustive and there are uncertainties in knowledge. This method usually results in a small probability of risk of a nuclear accident. Table 1 displays predictions for the PRA methodology, which can be compared with the historical record shown in Fig. 1 . The first column of Table 1 gives nuclear accident probabilities per reactor per year, denoted e. The numerical objective for core damage frequency, as evaluated from PRA studies, ranges from 10 -4 to 10 -6 for regulators in different countries (NEA-OECD 2012) . The second column shows the expected number of accidents in the whole history of the nuclear industry for each value of e. As of end of 2012, 437 reactors were in operation worldwide and the cumulative nuclear reactor-years of operation worldwide and including all reactor designs added up to 15,080 (European Nuclear Society 2014) . These values should correspond to the probability of a core damage accident of 0.15-1.5 for 15,080 reactor-years (15,080 times e). This number is small compared to the real number of accidents (see Fig. 1 ).
The third and fourth columns indicate the probabilities of having an accident in five and 30 years for 437 reactors, assuming that the reactor-year accident probability is e.
Given the complexity of the overall system, and the discrepancy between the values given by PRA analyses and the actual number of accidents, a holistic approach such as the use of historical frequencies is proposed and used in this study. We assess the frequency of a nuclear accident (INES level C4) and of a major accident (INES level = 7) from past experience.
In Sect. 2, the basis on which nuclear accidents have been selected to construct the data set is defined, and problems with the discrete INES scale, which does not take into account the complexities of a fuzzy reality, are discussed. Section 3 contains a review of some literature on nuclear accident risks with emphasis on probability estimates and nuclear accident inventories. In Sect. 4, the construction of the data set is described. The methods and results are presented in Sects. 5 and 6. Section 7 concludes.
INES scale and nuclear accidents
The International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES) is a worldwide tool for communicating to the Table 1 Four viewpoints on accidents probability. The probability of an accident per reactor per year (first column) remains the same along each line. The probability of seeing an accident depends on how many reactors are observed during how many years The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. It shall ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose'' (IAEA 2012)-and the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency-whose mission is ''To assist its member countries in maintaining and further developing, through international co-operation, the scientific, technological and legal bases required for a safe, environmentally friendly and economical use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. To provide authoritative assessments and to forge common understandings on key issues as input to government decisions on nuclear energy policy and to broader OECD policy analyses in areas such as energy and sustainable development''(NEA 2013). The INES scale classifies events on seven levels. For communicating to the public, distinct designations have been attributed to each level, from anomaly (level 1) to major accident (level 7): ''the severity of an event could increase by about an order of magnitude for each increase in level on the scale'' (IAEA 2009).
According to the IAEA, any event whose severity is rated at INES level C4 on the INES scale is an accident.
Below level 4, the event is called incident. As mentioned above and illustrated on Table 2 , there are many types of accidents. The potential consequences of an accident range from those limited to the reactor core, to those contained inside the pressure vessel, to the release of radioactivity in the environment and those affecting the population. Because of this diversity, there are several criteria to assess the severity of an accident and the INES defines a level 4 event by any of the following characteristics:
1. At least one death from radiation. 2. Minor release of radioactive material into the environment unlikely to result in implementation of planned countermeasure other than local food controls. 3. Fuel melt or damage to fuel resulting in more than 0.1 % release of core inventory. 4. Release of significant quantities of radioactive material within an installation with a high probability of significant public exposure.
The IAEA criteria provide the only agreed definition of a nuclear accident. However, the construction of an historical nuclear accident data set on the basis of the INES rating is an uncertain process for the following reasons:
• Back-rating The INES scale was developed only in 1990.
Many previous events are not officially rated on the scale. Unofficial ratings may be found in the literature, which may not be adequately justified.
• Fuzziness The INES scale is a communication instrument, 1 not a safety evaluation tool. The INES manual provides guidance for reporting the events using only a single number, but the proper definition of an accident is complex. The fuzziness of the categorization using the INES level is apparent from the above four criteria: The terms ''minor,'' ''likely'' and ''significant'' are used. It is also the case for higher levels: One of the characteristics of rating is the quantity of radioactivity released, and the boundaries between levels from 4 to 7 are set approximately to 500, 5,000 and 50,000 tera-becquerels (IAEA 2009, p. 17) . Moreover, the quantitative variables used to rate accidents, such as the released radioactivity, cannot be always precisely estimated.
• Heterogeneity The difficulty in characterizing an accident and its consequences precisely, and therefore the ensuing fuzziness of the INES scale, makes it impossible to ensure the historical and geographical uniformity of assessment, unlike the Richter earthquake magnitude scale, for example. This difficulty could be partially alleviated if there were a world entity in charge of the consistent interpretation and rating of an accident. But rating is the responsibility of the power plant owner, or of the regulation entity in certain countries such as France, which is therefore the unique source of primary information. This can lead to important differences in reporting.
• Secrecy To be notable, an event must have caused wellattested and substantial radioactivity release and contamination. However, it may happen that incidents or accidents are not reported nor made public. For example, an accident that occurred in September 1957 in Soviet Union, which contaminated 15,000 km 2 , was been acknowledged only decades later: the waste storage explosion at Mayak, a plutonium production reactor for nuclear weapons and nuclear fuel reprocessing plant, near Kyshtym. This accident would have been rated at level 6 on the INES scale. It was made public to the outside world by Soviet dissident Zhores Medvedev in 1976 (Medvedev 1976) . The fact that serious events are not made public may also occur in the West: on December 17, 1987, 18 months after the Chernobyl major accident, a serious incident occurred in the Biblis power station in West Germany. It became known internationally 9 months later in an expert meeting in Vienna and made public 1 year later in an article published by Nucleonics Week (Hibbs et al. 1988) . Therefore, this serious incident, rated at level 1 on the INES scale, in a purely civilian nuclear power plant was not known to the IAEA when it occurred. These examples underline the fact that some events, which could involve important radiation contamination or potential for much more serious consequences, can be kept secret from the public.
• Dual and multiple uses Some accidents cannot be attributed only to power production. This is the case for those occurring in nuclear reactors producing jointly isotopes and electric power. Also, research and commercial uses cannot be distinguished in the case of large-scale reactor prototypes.
• Simultaneity Power plants usually have two or more power reactor units. In our study, several simultaneous accidents at one plant are counted as a single one. In the case of the Fukushima Daichi major accident, computations have been made counting it as one accident as well as three accidents.
Previous studies on nuclear accident frequencies
There have been many studies on various aspects of nuclear accident frequencies, and their scope is restricted to specific types or to a limited number of accidents. Assessments range from the assertion that ''nuclear power plants are very robust'' (World Nuclear Association 2012) to the conclusion that ''nuclear power comes with the inevitability of catastrophic accidents'' (Ramana 2011). As stated above, Laponche and Dessus (2011) argued that nuclear accidents were statistically certain. They wrote that: ''On the basis of the major accidents having occurred these last 30 years, the occurrence probability of a major accident would therefore be about 50 % for France and more than 100 % for European Union.'' Giving more details on the calculations, Ghys (2011) estimated this later probability to be about 72 %, based the same data (4 catastrophic core failures-1 in Chernobyl, 3 in Fukushimafor 14 000 reactor-years). Stratton and Smith (1967) published the first seminal review of criticality accidents. His work covered a subset of nuclear accidents and did not look at commercial nuclear power plants. It was first revised in 1989 and updated again by McLaughlin et al. (2000) . The 2000 edition contains 60 accidents, 19 of which are new to it.
Lochbaum (2000), for the Union of Concerned Scientists, studied the risk assessment reports published by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission and concluded that the probability assessments were biased toward lower values by the use of many unrealistic assumptions regarding plant design, construction and operation, and a very limited number of human errors. Kastchiev et al. (2007) studied the safety records of nuclear power plants to assess risks and possible consequences of nuclear accidents. Based on the analysis of sixteen events, they concluded that ''many nuclear safety related events […] go either entirely unnoticed by the broader public or remain significantly under-evaluated when it comes to their potential risk.'' T. Cochran (2011) has stated that the historical frequency of core melt accident is about 1 in 1,400 reactoryears, which is rather far from the probability risk assessment estimate of 2 9 10 -5 -1 9 10 -4 events/reactor-year for accidents (INES level C4) published in 1986 by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Cochran's paper lists 12 nuclear power reactors (including Sodium Reactor Experiment), which have experienced fuel damage or partial core melt accidents.
Smythe (2011) proposed a new scale for the magnitude of nuclear accidents. He describes a list of 33 events in which he counts 4 events as catastrophic, leading him to conclude that ''A magnitude 7 or greater accident is to be expected every 12-15 years.'' Escobar Ranger and Lévêque (2014) have used a statistical-Poisson-model approach and performed a methodological study for the same problem of calculating the risk of a nuclear accident, based on continuous time models and reliability theory. They found that the Fukushima major accident leads to a reevaluation of previous risks assessments.
Construction of the data set
The Aircraft Crashes Record Office compiles all aircraft accidents in the civilian aviation sector and makes complete and detailed statistics available to the public (ACRO 2014). By contrast, in the civilian nuclear energy sector, there is no data set of nuclear accidents worldwide, and there is no way to have harmonized information on such events. The IAEA hosts a website called NEWS ''The Information Channel on Nuclear and Radiological Events'' which displays short reports of accidents as they are deposited on the website, but there is no website or directory of accidents including incident and accident statistics with detailed information on specific events. Moreover, in its disclaimer, the IAEA website declares: ''The IAEA makes no warranties, either express or implied, concerning the accuracy, completeness, reliability, or suitability of the information'' (IAEA 2014). Moreover, the IAEA is not legally bound to reply to all queries for information (Kastchiev et al. 2007 , note page 5).
Many online sources, including the IAEA, have been consulted for this study, but with no assurance that any of them is complete. For instance, the IAEA NEWS (2012) Web page states that ''event reports are filed and updated by participating countries which remain responsible for all related content'' and does not contain an archive that is publicly available. The available information for our data set include: event description, INES rating, related technical information and press releases. We also consulted accident lists published online by Wikipedia (2012) and other sources, other databases provided by nongovernmental organizations, or independent researchers, some which contain a lot of information such as Johnston's (2012) archives and Climatesceptics.org (2012). The detailed data set is available at http://www.centre-cired.fr/ IMG/pdf/nuclear-accidents-list.pdf.
In building this data set, the goal was to find and record all events rated at INES level C 3, which occurred at a licensed and commercially operational power plant since 1951, the start of nuclear energy for civilian purposes. Given the lack of a standardized and complete world data set, the reconstructed data set suffers from the deficiencies discussed in Sect. 2 above. There is uncertainty on the number of events and in their rating, since the INES levels are not precise enough, including in terms of released radioactivity, and thus, the boundary between accident and incidents is fuzzy.
The present study is based only on accidents with an INES level C4.
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Several accident types are listed in Table 2 . Only events of the categories described in the left column pertaining to the production of nuclear electricity are retained in the data set. The right column shows that many other types of radiological accidents are not taken into account in the present study: Military activities as well as those such as medical activities or industrial activities which cannot lead to major accidents were ignored.
For events before 1991, when the INES scale became operative, accident descriptions were used to assess a level equivalent to the INES level.
The full data set-all events with an INES level C3 in the power sector-contains 68 records. Table 3 lists all events with an INES level C4 in all types of nuclear facilities, and Table 4 lists the 13 accidents occurring in nuclear power plants-including two major ones related to the commercial nuclear power stations-which are the only ones kept for this study. Figure 1 shows the time distribution of events by INES level: There is a decrease in the number of accidents aver time, but the two 3 major accidents occur in the later decades. Figure 2 shows the number of nuclear reactors in operation as a function of time: The number of reactors increased steadily until the mid 1980s, and then remained at a roughly constant level until 2012. The comparison of those two figures shows that the bulk of accidents occurred before 1986 and that few accidents occurred when the number of reactors was at its maximum.
The event seriousness distribution is summarized in Table 5 . The absolute number of accidents decreases, but the damage on environment does not decrease.
Methods
An accident is defined as an event with an INES level C4, and the empirical frequency of the number of accidents over T years is computed using the method described below. Over the 61 years from 1951 to 2011, there were 49 years with no accident, 11 with one accident and 1 year with two accidents. The number of accidents in 1 year is modeled as a random variable denoted X. This variable takes the value 0, 1 and 2 with a probability respectively of 49/61, 11/61 and 1/61.
2 Since the limits between INES level are fuzzy, accidents rated at level = 3 were also searched for in the research to build the data set. They will be used, in a later study, to allow more specific tests regarding the influence on the results of this study stemming from a fuzzy frontier between different INES levels. 3 Or four major accidents if one considers that 3 major accidents occurred in Fukushima Daichi.
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The probability law of Y can be computed from the probability law of X. This is a classical problem of probability (see e.g., Dinwoodie and Foregger 2012) . The combinatorial counting required here is mathematically the same as the counting involved in the expansion of polynomial. This leads to use the so-called moment-generating function of a discrete variable X, defined by
The moment-generating function of Y can be obtained from the moment-generating function of X by polynomial expansion:
The coefficients of g Y (z) directly give the probability distribution of Y.
The results are shown in the Table 6a for T = 5 and in Table 6b for T = 30.
From the number of major accidents, where there have been 59 years with no accident and 2 years with one, the same method has been used with the generating function 59/61 ? 2/ 61 z. The results are shown on the second lines on Table 6a, b. Numerical results were verified with a different statistical method: the bootstrap method, which is well described in the general literature (see e.g., Johnson 2001) . This method relies on iterated computer simulations. It involves drawing 5 years randomly in {1951,…, 2011} and counting the accidents in these years. This is then repeated for 100,000 times to look at the statistical distribution of results. Since the repetition number is large, the statistical distribution of results is a satisfying approximation of the law of Y. The sample is represented in Fig. 1 as it contains the number of accidents per year.
The results are shown in the Table 7a for T = 5 and in Table 7b for T = 30.
Results
Calculations were performed for a 5-year time span, which correspond to a typical decision-making time horizon, and for the same 30-year time span, as used by Laponche, Dessus and Ghys.
The results presented in Table 6a show that for a sample of five random years, assuming that probability distribution of accidents is constant over the considered time span, the probability of having 1 year with one nuclear major accident (INES level = 7) is 14.3 %, and the probability of having two major accidents is 1.0 %. The probability of having at least one nuclear accident (INES level C4) in the same five random years sample is 66.6 %.
The results in Table 6b show that for a sample of thirty random years, the probability of drawing at least 1 year with a major accident is 63.2 %, and the probability for two or more major accidents is 25.8 %. These results are in agreement with the previously published studies. Table 7a , b shows the analogous results using the bootstrap method: The absolute differences with the numbers shown Tables 6 and 7 are always \0.2 %. This validates the numerical computations of this study since the generating functions method is exact, while the bootstrap method is approximate.
Systematic errors due to the inherent ambiguities and uncertainties in the construction of the data set as discussed in Sect. 2 have been estimated. For example, since the study is limited to operational nuclear power plants, it does not take into account the Kychtym accident nor the Tokai-Mura criticality accident. It could be argued that one should count all accidents related to the nuclear power industry, even those that occurred in reprocessing installations. As a sensitivity analysis study, probabilities were computed adding the Kyshtym event to the 13 accidents data set. The frequency of 5-year samples with no accidents drops from 33.4 to 30.2 %.
The main assumption underlying the computation of accident frequencies from past data is that the accident probability distribution in past years is constant. Since our data set is small, our discussion on auto-correlation and trends could be only qualitative (see Hofert and Wûthrich 2011, section 3 .1 for a quantitative analysis of these questions). Auto-correlation could occur for several reasons. The occurrence of an accident in a given year may tend to decrease the risk in the following year, because of increasing awareness of plant managers and regulators worldwide. On the other hand, an accident in a reactor may increase the risk of accident in another reactor of the same plant as was the case in Fukushima. As a sensitivity test, the same calculation was done coding Fukushima as three major accidents (INES level = 7). The results are presented on Table 8 .
Conclusion
Accidents at operational power plants have been considered for this study, an accident being defined as an event rated at INES level C4, and a major accident, as an INES level 7 event. Drawing samples of five random years from the past and assuming that they are all equiprobable, the probability of having a year with a nuclear major accident in 5 years is 14.3 %. The probability of having two major accidents in a 5-year time span is 1.0 %. The probability of having at least one nuclear accident is 66.6 % in a 5-year sample (Table 6a ). For a 30-year sample, we found that the probability of having at least one major accident was 63.2 %, with a 25.8 % probability of having at least two (Table 6b) . Our results are in agreement with previously published studies. Improving safety in the nuclear industry requires transparency. Since the data set completeness is a most important parameter in risk studies, we strongly support the establishment of a complete, harmonized and public international historical report of incidents and accidents worldwide and an obligation for plant owners to report all incidents and accidents. We consider that the IAEA would be the best-suited organization to host such a data set since Table 6 Probabilities of nuclear accident or major accident worldwide in 5 years (a) and 30 years (b) Severity of events P(N i = 0) (%) P(N i = 1) (%) P(N i = 2) (%) P(N i C 3) (%) Table 7 Probabilities of nuclear accident or major accident worldwide in 5 years (a) 30 years (b) using the bootstrap method Severity of events P(N i = 0) (%) P(N i = 1) (%) P(N i = 2) (%) P(N i C 3) (%) Table 8 Probabilities of nuclear accident or major accident worldwide in 5 years (a) and using the bootstrap method (b) counting the Fukushima event as three major accidents Severity of events P(N i = 0) (%) P(N i = 1) (%) P(N i = 2) (%) P(N i C 3) (%) Severity of events P(N i = 0) (%) P(N i = 1) (%) P(N i = 2) (%) P(N i C 3) (%) this task would fit very well its objectives outlined in its charter.
